The Armies of the English East India Company were the precursor to the British Indian Army, which was itself the precursor to the Army of Independent India. The armies of the EEIC were divided into three Presidential Armies, these were the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Presidencies. These Presidencies themselves were the result of the establishment and expansion of "factories" (which were fortified settlements within which English traders stored their goods and used them as a selling station) by the EEIC between 1612 to 1757. These were established by acquisition of firmans which means edicts or grants from local rulers such as the Mughal Emperors, Mughal Governors or Marathas. By the middle of the 18th century, three factory towns, namely Madras, Bombay and Calcutta came into prominence as they grew in size and strength.
Eventually, the EEIC, began acquiring land and power in and around these fortified settlements, via a policy of supporting competing Indian princes in their wars for acquiring power. This was the experience of the Carnatic wars. The EEIC adopted a policy of helping native Nawabs and princes acquire power and promised to keep them secure while in return the Nawabs and princes gave them trade concessions. The EEIC also waged war against other companies and by 1757, had managed to kick out most of their competition. However, the watershed moment for the EEIC would come after their victory at the Battle of Plassey which assured them territorial rights in the Bengal province of the Mughal Empire. The conflict was the result of an Imperial Mughal firman being granted to the EEIC by then Mughal Emperor Farrukhsiyar, in 1717 giving the British East India Company the right to reside and trade in the Mughal Empire. They were allowed to trade freely, except for a yearly payment of 3,000 rupees. The company was given the right to issue dastak (passes) for the movement of goods, which was misused by company officials for personal gain. The transgressions of the company brought them into conflict with the Nawabs of Bengal, and the defeat of the Nawab at Plassey allowed the British to place their own candidate on the Throne, to acquire all the land within the Maratha Ditch and 600 yards (550 m) beyond it and the zamindari of all the land between Calcutta and the sea.
RECRUITMENT
Now, we return to the Indian sepoy. The British had begun employing Indian sepoys to protect their "factories" as early as 1612 itself when the very first factories were established. However, initially these men served as watchmen and guards, with the passage of time, their function and proportion as part of the armed forces of the Presidencies grew significantly. By 1824, the size of the combined armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay was about 200,000 and had at least 170 sepoy and 16 European regiments. In 1844, the combined average strength of the three armies was 235,446 native and 14,584 European. For purposes of simplification, we shall take the example of the Bengal Presidency. The English shared the opinion that was common in India since the ancient period, that there were certain "races" best suited for the purpose of war. These races had a "mercenary spirit, were of good stature and complexion, were drawn from the yeoman or land owning peasantry and were suitable for the style of warfare practiced in the Early Modern period". This led to these races being labelled as "martial races". Not surprisingly, these were the same "races" that had since the ancient and medieval period held the privilege to rule or to hold beaurocratic or military positions. Such as Brahmins, Rajputs, Muslims (Afghans, Iranians, Turks,), Khatris eventually Sikhs.
Hence, the sepoys of the Bengal Presidency, were in fact not recruited from the Provinces of Bengal or Bihar or Odissa. The British felt that the Bengalis were best suited for clerical work and that the South Indians were smaller in stature and lacked the physical robustness they wanted in their soldiers. Therefore, the entirety of the soldiers of the Bengal Presidency were drawn from the Kingdom of Oudh, which was an ally of the British ever since their Nawab was defeated by the Company at the Battle of Buxar and signed the Allahabad Treaty.
The soldiers that were recruited were mostly drawn from the Brahmin and Rajput castes of Oudh commonly known as Purbiyas. The term Purbiya originated in medieval India. It was used as a term to refer to mercenaries belonging to the Brahmin or Rajput caste from Oudh and Western Bihar. Throughout the medieval and early modern period, these were the preferred mercenaries highered, by mansabdars, Wazirs, Rajas and Mughal Emperors.
The process of recruitment was quite informal. For example, men who sought mercenary work were easy to find, usually the infantry of the native armies received little attention and soldiers could be convinced by promise of better prospects to join the army. In addition to this, the old feudal networks of recruitment were utilised as well, meaning "zamindars" (hereditary rulers of enormous tracts of land and the peasants who enjoyed land rights within their jurisdiction, from whom they reserved the right to collect tax on behalf of imperial courts or for military purposes) as well as serving officers and soldiers were required to encourage enlistment in the army among their estates, their family and close friends. To give you a perspective, by the early 19th century, this informal system of recruitment had become so well entrenched that the Brahmins of Oudh dominated the Bengal Presidential Army and represented roughly 40% of it's total strength.
MOTIVATIONS
As far as their motivations are concerned, the common peasant of this period usually did not posses a sense of nationalism or nationhood. War was ever present and Nawabs/Rajas and dynasties were overthrown quite often. Usually men enlisted in the army either because they were Brahmins and Rajputs and belonged to a long line of soldiers and military adventures, hence tradition. Or because they were land owning Brahmins or Rajputs who required additional income and were looking for livelihood. The taxation under the Mughal Empire used to vary but usually remained at around 20-25% of the total value of the produce from land cultivated. With the advent of the EEIC and their expansion, more and more areas were subjected to the practice of revenue farming in the North starting with Bengal, which raised tax rates to a crushing level, much has been said of the condition of the farmers in the Bengal region. And while the conditions of primary zamindars (farmers who held land as patrimony) was better in Oudh under the rule of their own sovereign, the King of Oudh, it gradually got worse owing to the heavy payments the King of Oudh had to pay to the British. To give you a perspective on this here's some background :
This particular time period starting from late 18th century, saw the expenses of Oudh sky rocketing owing to the fact that the army was growing and had to grow given the threat of the Sikhs and Afghans in the west. Plus, the Marathas were still an ever present nuisance, that could at any moment raid the border Provinces and cause loss of life, wealth and create chaos.
The Nawab's army under Shuja-ud-Daulah (the 3rd Nawab of Awadh), was a formidable force. Boasting roughly 50,000 men, most of them Purbiyas. This was further augmented with a force of Qizilbash horsemen, a remnant of the Nadir Shah episode, during which the founder of the dynasty of Oudh, Saadat Ali Khan and his successor, Safdar Jung made sure to remind the Persian conqueror and his forces of the fact that they are tied to Awadh and their roots lie in Nishapur, hence any Qizilbash horsemen who wanted to seek their fortunes in India, joined the Nawab's army.
Sadly for Asaf-ud-Daulah, the son of Shuja-ud-Daulah, the British had gained a firm foot in Bengal. They had defeated the Nawabi army at Buxar. And hence, the British resident at the Awadhi court required the Nawab to maintain a force of Englishmen within his territory, at the Nawab's expense. And make no mistake, these soldiers were expensive. To give you an idea, the Subsidiary forces in Oudh, in 1797, amounted to :
1 Regiment of European Infantry rank and file (950 men)
5 Companies of European artillery (332 men)
14 companies of lascars (1032 men)
2 Regiments of Native Infantry (924 men)
2 Regiments of Native Cavalry (6800 men)
The Hindustani Regiment of Cavalry (367 men)
The 27th Regiment of Dragoons at Cawnpore or Kanpur (353 men)
A total of 10,741 men.
These men, along with the native forces of Oudh itself, amounted to an expense of Rs. 75,00,000 give or take. Keep in mind, the total revenues of Oudh were estimated to be Rs. 2,37,98,557 in 1797 and the yearly expenditure was estimated to be around Rs. 2,36,82,895 meaning that the government often ran into deficit, given the pay for its armies, it's subsidiary armies, it's resident, its ministers, it's beaurocracy and the Nawab's private expenses.
Hence, the added pressure on the farmers of Oudh was not so much owing to maladministration (and it wasn't as if there was none of it) but more due to the growing burden of expenditure and payments to the British.
EXPERIENCE BEFORE 1857
Now to discuss the experience that these soldiers went through. It should be no surprise, that despite being as able and as formidable as their European counterparts, the native soldier was paid less than his European counterpart, had very limited chances for promotion beyond the post of "subedar" or sergeant. Was required to take care of the manual duties of his European counterparts, such as carrying supplies, setting up tents etc. The campaigns were hard and the wars were constant. The Anglo Mysore wars of which there were 4, the Anglo-Maratha Wars of which there were 3, The first and Second Anglo-Sikh wars, the Anglo-Afghan wars and so on. The equipment of the native soldier was often comprised on. In any conflict, the death toll of the native soldier was always higher. Yet, there were a few bright spots for the soldier's life. Military service brought social recognition, the word of a subedar in the army, meant that his relative, for example his nephew who found himself facing a sentence at the local court could be spared on the promise that he would join the army. A steady flow of income was at least guaranteed and there was, until the early 19th century a feeling of camaraderie among the European officers and their native sepoys, since these officers felt that the well being of the sepoys was their responsibility.
But this wouldn't always be true and eventually, the older officer corps was replaced with a new batch of officers who saw India as the land of opportunity and plunder and cared less for their unit and native sepoys and more for acquisition of wealth to take back to England. The situation was also worsened by the fact that these new officers didn't have the same cultural sensitivity toward the sepoys as the older corps. They were very much products of their time, which meant that even though the native sepoys were just as capable and effective as them in combat, their European counterparts looked upon them as inferior, in racial and cultural terms. Needless to say, this atmosphere of racism only further charged the already tense atmosphere surrounding the period between 1856-1857. Not to mention such sentiments were only further aggravated and entrenched during and after the Rebellion, owing to the tone and language of reporting of the situation in Britain by local newspapers and the depiction of the events by contemporary writers. Such sentiments carried through to the World Wars themselves.
Now, the Rebellion of 1857, did change a lot for these soldiers. Let's look at why the rebellion happened, who rebelled and what consequences they suffered as a result.
MOTIVATIONS FOR THE REBELLION
The Rebellion of 1857, was started due to and was the result of in large part the discontent of the native sepoys of the Bengal Presidential Army. These aforementioned injustices that the sepoys went through only further strained the relationship they had with their employers, especially after the company usurped Oudh from its Nawab on false ground of maladministration and imposed heavy tax farming revenues obligations on its zamindari/taluqadari class. This imposition of a heavy tax burden meant that the rural peasantry of Oudh, the very peasantry which supplied the Bengal Army with it's native sepoys had become more and more hostile towards it. The discontent of the farmers and families of the sepoys would naturally find its way into the general perception and feeling the sepoys had towards the Company. Hence, due to its polices the Company had turned the sepoys of Oudh, it's peasantry and its lower nobility against itself. Meanwhile, thanks to the Company's policy of aggressive expansion, the Company had made enemies of many prominent noble houses in North India, including, The Nawabs of Awadh, the Kingdom of Jhansi, the successor of the Peshwa of the Maratha Empire at Kanpur and many smaller noble houses as well.
The discontent of the Oudh sepoys were manifold. Apart from the aforementioned concerns the sepoys also felt cheated when they were denied the "bhatta" or bonus for foreign service. Since, after the annexation of Punjab, Awadh and most of North India these regions weren't considered "foreign". The Oudh sepoys of the Bengal Presidency were also incredibly strict regarding their caste and religious practices. Crossing the Indus was considered to result in a loss of caste. Consumption of pig and cow meat was forbidden for the Muslim and Brahmin and Rajput members of the Bengal army. The Brahmins were roughly 40%, the Rajputs were around 20% as well as Ahirs and Muslims. This meant that the Bengal Army was also a lot less diverse compared to the armies of Bombay or Madras. The fact that the British organised their armies into homogenous single battalion regiments drawn from one caste, also added to the large support base that the resentments found among the Bengal Army and the ease with which sepoys could organise and prepare themselves for action.
Therefore, there existed a powder keg, of resentment against the Company which the Company lit itself by introducing the "match" which was the Pattern 1853, Enfield, rifled musket. To load the new rifle, soldiers had to bite a cartridge open and pour the gunpowder it contained into the rifle's muzzle, then stuff the paper cartridge (overlaid with a thin mixture of beeswax and mutton tallow for waterproofing) into the musket as wadding, the ball being secured to the top of the cartridge and guided into place for ramming down the muzzle.
Many sepoys believed that the cartridges that were standard issue with the new rifle were greased with lard (pork fat) which was regarded as unclean by Muslims and tallow (cow fat) which angered the Hindus. The sepoys' British officers dismissed these claims as rumors, and suggested that the sepoys make a batch of fresh cartridges, and greased these with pig and cow fat. This reinforced the belief that the original issue cartridges were indeed greased with lard and tallow.
On the 29th of March, 1857, a Brahmin sepoy named Mangal Pandey, attacked his British officers and his capture and subsequent hanging marked the beginning of the revolt.
AFTERMATH OF THE REBELLION AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SEPOY
Once the revolt was suppressed, those noble houses that had participated in it with the sepoys were either extinguished or fled into exile. The sepoys themselves were either killed in action or sentenced to be shot by a cannon. Among the groups that were recruited into the Bengal Army, the Brahmins of Oudh payed the heaviest price for this revolt, as the perception among the British was that the Brahmins being the highest in the social ladder had invoked religious fervour among the Rajputs and were the primary cause for strict caste and religious practices prevalent in the Bengal Army. Hence, in subsequent years, once the British Crown assumed full ownership and control of the Company's property and armies, the recruitment policy of the army was changed. The percentage of Brahmins fell from 40% to around 8-12% until the World Wars.
Overall, the perception of the Oudh sepoy, who was until the mutiny, considered an invincible conqueror of the Sikhs, the Marathas, Mysore, Nepal and Afghans changed and he was now seen as an inferior in military affairs when compared to the loyal Sikhs of the Punjab, and the Rajputs of the Rajputana or the Marathas and the Southerners who had remained loyal and had not joined the revolt.
Sources :
"The Hybrid Military Establishment of the East India Company in South Asia: 1750–1849" by Kaushik Roy
"Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c. 1740--1849" by Kaushik Roy
"The Martial Races of India" by Lt. General Sir George McMunn
"The Armies of India" by Lt. General Sir George McMunn
"The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and Sepoy" by Gajendra Singh
"An historical account of the rise and progress of the Bengal Native Infantry, from its first formation in 1757, to 1796 when the present regulations took place, together with a detail of the services on which the several battalions have been employed" by Captain John Williams
"Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire" by C. A Bayly
"An Advanced History of India" by RC Majumdar
"The Structure and Organisation of the Bengal Native Infantry with special reference to problems of discipline (1796-1852)" by Amiya Sen
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